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This paper argues that the pattern of decolonisation in West Africa was a func-
tion of the nature of human capital transfers from the colonisers to the indigenous
elites of the former colonies. Underpinning the nature of these human capital trans-
fers is the colonial educational ideology. Where this ideology emphasized the no-
tion of "assimilation", the system generally tended to produce elites that depended
highly on the coloniser for their livelihood, hence necessitating a continuation of the
imperial relationship even after independence was granted. On the contrary, where
the ideology emphasized the "strengthening of the solid elements" of the country-
side, the system tended to produce a bunch of elites that were quite independent of
the coloniser and consequently had little to loose from a disruption of the imperial
relationship at independence. The model raises several predictions based on a single
assumption on the nature of the nationalist elite. The paper￿ s contribution, is in pro-
viding a framework for understanding the di⁄erent paths of decolonisation in Africa
in general, but more speci￿cally in the British and French West African empires, an
approach which uni￿es both the Eurocentric and Afrocentric perspectives.
Keywords: Decolonisation, Human Capital Transfers, Eurocentrism, Afrocen-
trism, West Africa.
JEL Codes: 043, I21, 015.
1 Introduction
The pattern in which decolonisation took place in sub-saharan Africa was quite intrigu-
ing. While the French peacefully withdrew from their sub-Saharan African (henceforth
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1abbreviated as SSA) empires in one day,1 paving the way for a transition from colonial-
ism to neo-colonialism, the British were unable to decolonise smoothly, and the transition
to independence in British SSA colonies was generally antagonistic, often culminating in
complete independence from England. The traditional reasons2 advanced in the literature
in support of the concomitant decisions by the colonisers to withdraw from empires fail
to account for these contrasting decolonisation patterns in SSA.
The objective of this paper is to attempt an explanation of why the pattern of de-
colonisation in the French SSA empires di⁄ered signi￿cantly from that in the British
SSA empires. Speci￿cally, the study models the role of human capital transfers from the
colonisers to the indigenous elites of the colonies in the process of decolonisation. This
approach, it is hoped, will forge a uni￿ed economic interpretation of decolonisation which
might in turn, contribute to a fuller understanding of the dynamics of change that brought
about twentieth century decolonisation processes.
But ￿rst a working de￿nition of the concepts of colonisation and decolonisation is in
order. The term "colonisation" in this study is understood to mean the process of creation
of empires,3 whilst "decolonisation" describes the process of European withdrawal from
empires, whether they be empires of sovereign administration or of trusteeship adminis-
tration.4
Because decolonisation is a profoundly complex historical process with multi-faceted
determinants, it makes intellectual sense to limit this study both in time and in space.
This study thus proposes to model the decolonisation processes in West Africa during
the twentieth century and the focus is naturally on the British and French decolonisa-
tion processes, although the model also provides useful insight into other decolonisation
1Besides Guinea, which unilaterally withdrew from the French community in 1958, all French sub-
Saharan African colonies received their political independence from Paris on the same date in 1960.
2These reasons have been regrouped into three major schools, namely, the Eurocentric, Afrocentric
and Liberal explanations of decolonisation, Thorn (2000). The Eurocentric school basically argues that
the colonisers themselves sought to withdraw from empires because it was no longer in their economic
or political interest to continue colonial rule, while the Afrocentric view argues that the colonisers were
forcefully evicted from empires by elite-led nationalist movements. The liberal view on its part, places
the fulcrum of change within shifts in international relations.
3Historians have generally distinguished colonisation from imperialism, the latter referring to the
process of creation of empires and the former referring to only those parts that were actually settled in
by the people of the imperialist power, Thorn (2000). Modern day historians have used the term "formal
empires" to denote colonisation and "informal empires" to describe territories that were not settled in
by Europeans. For simplicity, I make no distinction between either forms of empires and I will use the
terms colonisation and imperialism interchangeably.
4In spite of the fact that the decolonisation of UN trust territories established after World War II was
supposed to be predetermined and smooth, it often wasn￿ t the case which is why we include them in this
category.
2processes outside the region.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 brie￿ y highlights the major distinguishing
features of British and French colonial education policies in West Africa and also contrasts
the di⁄erent perceptions and reactions of Anglophone and Francophone West African
elites to post-World War II (WWII) colonisation and decolonisation discourse. Section
3 presents the model, discusses the results and the theoretical implications. Section 4
provides some empirical evidence to back the predictions of the model while section 5
concludes.
2 Distinguishing Aspects of British and French Colo-
nial Education Practices
Historians generally believe that the major distinguishing features between the British and
French colonisation in black Africa are rooted in their divergent objectives and approaches
to colonial education. Whereas French colonial education ideology emphasized the notion
of assimilation, British colonial education is believed to have emphasized instead the
"strengthening of the solid elements of the countryside."5 I now consider each of these
ideologies separately.
2.1 French Colonial Ideology of Educational Transfers
The French assimilatory policy in education was rooted in an imperial ideology that
colonies were one and indivisible with France. In the o¢ cial French mind, France had no
colonies, but departments, Thorn (2000:27). Several authors argue that French colonial
education, was aimed at making Frenchmen of Africans.6 Hence, the way in which ed-
ucation was generally administered in French African colonies was by boarding primary
pupils in far-away schools, where they were taught by French teachers, using the French
language and French textbooks.7 These pupils only returned to their villages during the
long vacations. It has also been argued that, the content of educational programs in
French African colonies aimed essentially at alienating the elites from their own culture
5See Gi⁄ord & Louis (1971:700), Thorn (2000:25) and Cain & Hopkins (1993:218-19).
6See for instance, Anne Ra⁄enel (1856), Gi⁄ord & Louis (1971:552) and Mazrui & Tidy (1984:377).
7Gi⁄ord & Louis (1971:552) have argued that the main idea behind the insistence on French as the
medium of instruction is because French colonial authorities believed that by speaking French, the natives
would ultimately end up thinking in French and feeling French.
3and society.
For instance, Gi⁄ord & Louis (1971:697) report that history textbooks in use in French
African colonies were written in such a way as to encourage Africans to deny the validity
of their own cultural traditions and to admire instead those of the French. Gi⁄ord &
Louis (op.cit) further contend that while attempts were made to teach the African about
their own milieu, they were nevertheless continuously reminded that everything about
their environment was inferior to France and the French way of life. Therefore, if African
students did master their lessons well, it should be di¢ cult to imagine how they could
have done so without internalising the assumptions, standards and prejudices of French
culture and society.
In addition, through well tailored educational curricula, black francophone African
elites were systematically led into believing in France￿ s superiority in the military, tech-
nical, scienti￿c, economic and cultural ￿elds, and it was therefore logical for these elites
to seek to share in the bene￿ts of this superiority through continued imperial relationship
with France, Chafer (2002).
Furthermore, it is claimed that an important o⁄shot of the assimilatory education
o⁄ered to Francophone African elites was that these elites became alienated from the
rest of their countrymen, resulting in an idyllic sense of dependency of these elites on
France. For instance, Francophone African elites were given French citizenship, and some
of them even became ministers and paliamentarians in the French cabinet and legislature
in Paris whilst the general population was subjected to the punitive "code d￿ indigØnat".8
This discriminatory code not only denied rights to French citizenship to the population
masses, but also subjected them to a punitive taxation system and forced labour. This
discriminatory treatment of elites probably explains why Chipman (1989:86) has argued
that in French black Africa:
"independence was intentionally granted as a "gift" whose acceptance by the
newly created states was implicitly meant to ensure a close relationship with
France".
Finally, some authors have argued that French colonial education was designed to
create an ￿ administrative bourgeoisie￿that depended highly on the colonial bureaucracy
8The indigØnat was a legislative code that allowed colonial o¢ cials to punish any African subject with
a prison sentence or a ￿ne, as a matter of discipline and without trial, Chafer (op.cit).
4for its survival. The protagonist of this viewpoint is Moumouni (1968:46)9 who described
French colonial education as:
"cut rate, designed to secure subordinate o¢ cials by impoverishing their spir-
itual life and detaching them completely from their own people, and that it
produced an anti-national, bureaucratic neo-bourgeoisie"
Based on the preceding, two important inferences can be made about French colonial
education practice in black Africa. Firstly, it created an elite that was least inclined to
entering into violent confrontation with France. Put alternatively, French assimilatory
educational practice produced a bunch of elites who were naturally inclined to favouring
a continuation of the imperial relationship with France, instead of advocating for "real"
independence as their anglophone peers did.
The second major inference about French colonial education is that it contributed in
destroying the traditional and cultural ties of the elites with their countrymen,10 implying
that francophone elites were more likely to face serious collective action problems in
rallying the support of the general population in rebellion against the French. A few
anecdotes will help elucidate these points.
In 1951, during the peak of independence struggles in Africa, the "to-be" ￿rst Ivorian
President Houphouºt Boigny is quoted to have declared that:
"independence was not the best solution for Africa"11
Another emblematic ￿gure of French assimilation in West Africa, Leopold Senghor of
Senegal,12 who together with Houphouºt Boigny became ministers in the French govern-
ment and staunch advocates of the French Union ensuring that French interests prevailed
even when the empire started crumbling, is quoted to have declared in an interview in
1955 that:
"What I fear is that, in the future, under the fatal pressure of African
liberation, we might be induced to leave the French orbit. We must stay not
only in the French Union but in the French Republic13"
9Gann & Duignan (1970) also argue that the type of education given to Francophone African graduates
made them more inclined to government employment than their counterparts in British colonies.
10Both Suret-Canale (1971) and Cohen (1971) have supporting evidence to this hypothesis.
11See Martin (2005:63)
12Senghor is also reputed to have made the famous remark that "To be a Frenchman above all is an
excellent prescription on the political level". Martin (2005:59).
13Quoted in Martin (2005:61).
5Yet another prominent francophone West African elite, Blaise Diagne, who became
Senegal￿ s black deputy to the French Paliament between 1914-1934, is quoted after a
meeting of the second Pan-African Conference held in 1921 in Paris to have declared
that:
"his loyalty to France came ahead of his loyalty to other blacks14"
Evidently, the French were more successful in cultivating a small black elite to whom
they accorded full rights of citizenship in France, on condition of course, that these elites
accept assimilation into French society and reject their African heritage, family law and
customs. No doubt these elites saw themselves and were seen as Frenchmen brought up
in a tradition of loyalty to France, willingly accepting its government, its language and
culture, which was not the case with Anglophone West African elites.15 Cohen (1971:204)
concludes that:
"independence has by no means broken the close ties between France and its
former colonies. The legacy of assimilation has continued. France more than
any other former colonial power feels committed to aiding her dependencies
and the French government gives her former colonies in Black Africa more aid
than does Britain to her entire commonwealth, which contains ￿fteen times as
large a population".
2.2 British Colonial Ideology of Educational Transfers
British colonial education practice was ￿rmly inscribed in a colonial governance philosophy
of "indirect rule". As Gi⁄ord & Louis (1971:700) have argued, the idea of indirect rule
was ￿rmly rooted in the fears expressed by the colonial administration of releasing a pool
of "unemployable" school leavers and the potential threat that constituted members of
this group on the rest of the population. This view is con￿rmed in this statement in 1920
by the Colonial Governor of Berber Province (Sudan):
"our purpose is to strengthen the solid elements in the countryside...before the
irresponsible body of half-educated o¢ cials, students and town ri⁄-ra⁄ takes
control of the public mind16"
14Quoted in Gi⁄ord & Louis (1971:842).
15Thomas Hodgkin (1954) in Martin (2005) posits that any black African who was politically conscious
in British West Africa was automatically an anti-colonial nationalist of some kind.
16Quoted in Gi⁄ord & Louis (1971:700) and also in Thorn (2000:25) from Cain & Hopkins (1993:218-
19).
6As Gi⁄ord & Louis (1971) argue further, the un-intended consequence of wanting to
strengthen the "solid elements" in the countryside was that British colonial education
policy became tailored to emphasize village schools and the preservation of local realities
as well as the indigenous way of thinking. Thus, the strengthening of the "solid elements"
was manifested through the administration of instruction at the elementary and primary
levels in the villages, using native teachers and the local vernacular languages of the
indigenous populations.
Unlike French colonial education, the preservation of the indigenous patterns of think-
ing and traditions were a key priority of British colonial education ideology as can be
observed from this recommendation from the Advisory Committee on Native Education
in the British Tropical Dependencies in 192517:
"Education should be adapted to the mentality, aptitudes, occupations and
traditions of the various peoples, conserving as far as possible all sound and
healthy elements in the fabric of their social life; adapting them where necessary
to changed circumstances and progressive ideas as an agent of natural growth
and evolution..."
In addition, British colonial education policy allowed a preponderant role to mission-
ary bodies in educational provision which largely accounts for the widespread expansion
of education in British colonies as opposed to French colonies. This also increased the like-
lihood of inclination of anglophone nationalist elites to anti-capitalist political ideologies
(or betterstill, socialist philosophies) due to improper monitoring. As Foster (1965:139)
puts it:
"Western education was indirectly responsible for creating a group to whom
access into the highest levels of the bureaucracy was denied and who constituted
the core of the early nationalist movement on the Gold Coast. It was this
minority of professional lawyers and intelligentsia who supplied the leadership
of nationalist activities throughout most of the colonial period".
Finally, it is arguable that the most important un-intended consequence of the British
education policy of "strengthening the solid elements of the countryside", was the forma-
tion of an anglophone elite that was independent in thought and less dependent on the
colonial bureaucracy for its livelihood.
17Quoted in Gi⁄ord & Louis (1971:688).
7Based on the foregoing, two important inferences can be made about British colonial
education practice in black Africa. Firstly, the elite that was created was more inclined to
entering into violent confrontation with the British colonial authorities since they never
really depended on the latter for their livelihood. Secondly, British colonial education
contributed in reinforcing the traditional and cultural ties of the elites with their coun-
trymen, implying that anglophone elites were less likely to face serious collective action
problems in rallying the support of the general population in rebellion against the British.
A few anecdotes will help elucidate these points.
Within anglophone West African nationalist elite circles, the feeling was generally
shared that European colonisation has brought about inequalities, and exploitation of the
African. Thorn (2000:5) recounts a much told African joke which runs thus:
"When the whiteman came to Africa, we (the Africans) had the land and
he (the whiteman) had the bibles. He said, let us close our eyes and pray.
When we opened them again, he had the land and we had the bibles!"
As short as the joke might appear, it is nonetheless very profound. It depicts the im-
pression in the anglophone African mind, that colonisation was theft, aided and abetted
by the Christian religion. Both Nkrumah and Nyerere, the leading pro-socialist anglo-
phone anti-colonial nationalists were of the ￿rm conviction that colonisation has destroyed
the essential values of African society and needed to be repealed. In an essay on African
socialism in 1962, Nyerere gave an idyllic account of pre-colonial African society:
"Everybody was a worker...Not only was the capitalist or the landed exploiter
unknown...[but] capitalist exploitation was impossible. Loitering was an unthinkable
disgrace...The advent of colonialism has changed all this. In the old days, the African
had never aspired to the possession of personal wealth for the purpose of dominating
any of his fellows. He never had labourers or factory hands to do his work for him,
but then came the foreign capitalists. They were wealthy and powerful. And the
African naturally started wanting to be wealthy too. While nothing seems inherently
wrong with that, it has unfortunately led to exploitation. There was now need for
Africans to "re-educate" themselves, to regain their former attitude of mind...in
rejecting the capitalist attitude of mind which colonialism brought into Africa, we
must reject also the capitalist methods which go with it".18
18Quoted in Martin (2005:145).
8In summary, the story of colonial education ideologies seems to suggest that colonial ed-
ucational transfers contributed to the demise of the British empire in black Africa, whereas
it paradoxically fostered the continuation of France￿ s imperialism (or neo-colonialism) in
the region.
As evidence, France unlike Britain,19 still percieves its sub-Saharan African empires
as permanent and the vitality of the fran￿afrique20 is still much evident today. At the
political level, this is exempli￿ed by regular French Presidential visits and the annual
Franco-African summits. On the economic front, Chafer (1995;556) notes that former
French SSA colonies are a recipient of nearly two-thirds of all French bilateral aid since
1960. On the monetary front, the Franc CFA continues to unite France to twelve of its
former SSA colonies while on the military front, France continues to maintain permanent
military bases in almost all of its former SSA colonies. Of no lesser signi￿cance ofcourse,
is the continued promotion of the French language and French culture in Africa through
cultural cooperation and the annual summits of La Francophonie.
3 The Model
I now outline a simple model to formalise the idea that the pattern of decolonisation is
a function of the nature of human capital transfers from the colonisers to the indigenous
elites. I consider a colonised society with three players namely, the coloniser, indigenous
elites (henceforth referred to simply as, the elite) and the general population (henceforth
referred to as the masses). Colonisation is exempli￿ed by the extraction of rent from
output (Y ) by the coloniser. The size of the elite population is de￿ned as Le; while
the size of the general population is de￿ned as (L ￿ Le) where L is the size of the total
population of the country.
The elite receives a tranfer X from the coloniser, in the form of education, in order
to enhance the productivity of the colony (as illustrated in the previous chapter). The
masses instead receive a basic subsistence salary. Thus Y is the total output from the
colony, net of subsistence payments to the masses.
The strategy of the coloniser is to either continue colonial rule or transfer power to the
19British decolonisations were generally accompanied by substantial British withdrawal from the
colonies and the British government made a deliberate committment not to intervene in African a⁄airs
after independence was granted. See for instance, Gi⁄ord & Louis (1971).
20The basis of France￿ s traditional relations with Africa, marked by personal ties with the ruling,
corrupt elites of its former colonies.
9elite (implying decolonisation). Continuing with colonial rule procures to the coloniser a
rent, which is equivalent to (Y ) minus the cost of transfers to the elite (X) and minus
whatever is necessary to maintain stability in the colony. Alternatively, the coloniser can
decide to leave the country to its own destiny.
The strategy of the elite during both colonisation and decolonisation, is to either
cooperate or not cooperate with the coloniser. Cooperation with the coloniser during
colonisation o⁄ers a ￿xed payo⁄ to the elite equivalent to X > 0. Non-cooperation
(or rebellion), on the other hand, results in a war of independence, whose outcome is
uncertain. The probability of a successful rebellion depends critically on the attitude of
the masses. When the masses are in cooperation with the elite in rebellion, the probability
of success is much higher than otherwise. The relationship between the elite and the
masses also critically a⁄ects the strategic choices faced by the elite during decolonisation.
During decolonisation (or betterstill, after independence), the elite might choose to ask
for the coloniser￿ s protection against any future subversion of their power by the masses21
or not cooperate with the coloniser in this regard.22 If the elite choses cooperation with
the coloniser post independence, it will have to pay an amount, Q > 0, to the coloniser.
Q is the cost of purchasing the coloniser￿ s protection against possible subversion of the
power of the elite by the masses.
Alternatively, if the elite choose not to cooperate with the coloniser post independence,
Q is zero. However, in this case, the elite will have to incur whatever costs that is necessary
in order to maintain stability in the country.
The strategy of the masses during both colonisation and decolonisation is to either
cooperate with the elite in all the choices that the elite make or never cooperate with them
in this regard. The decision of the masses to cooperate or not cooperate with the elite is
a function of the credibility of the elite, generically intended as the degree of trust that
the masses have in the elite￿ s promises. Credibility of the elite in turn, is a function of
the nature of human capital transfers that they receive from the coloniser. Accordingly,
the elite is percieved as credible by the masses whenever the nature of human capital
transfers to the elite emphasize "local adaptation" or "non-alienation".23 In contrast,
21The consensus between the elite and the colonisers post independence implies cooperation in the
context of this model.
22It is important to emphasize that cooperation between the post independence governing elites and
the colonisers is a quid pro quo whereby the elites give up some amount of the former colony￿ s resources
in exchange for the coloniser￿ s military backing of their regimes. An example of such a deal could be
the military accords of cooperation signed between France and its former colonies in black Africa at
independence.
23This is a reasonable axiom in the sense that when human capital transfers emphasize local realities,
10the elite is percieved as non credible whenever the nature of human capital transfers
emphasize "assimilation" of the elite.24
When the elite is credible, the optimal strategy of the masses is to always cooperate
with them, both during colonisation and decolonisation. Cooperation with the elite during
colonisation results in a ￿xed payo⁄to the masses, equivalent to a basic subsistence salary.
Cooperation with the credible elite during decolonisation, instead procures an expected
income to the masses, based on a promise by the elite to share the gains of decolonisation
with them.25 By de￿nition, the option of the masses not cooperating with a credible elite
is excluded.
In the opposite scenario of a non credible elite, the optimal strategy of the masses
is always non-cooperation with these elite both during colonisation and decolonisation.
Cooperation of the masses during colonisation always yields a basic subsistence salary
received from the coloniser, whereas cooperation during decolonisation also yields a basic
salary, received this time from the elite. Non-cooperation of the masses during colonisation
and decolonisation also procures a ￿xed income to the masses26 with the added di⁄erence
that the coloniser now incurs an extra cost for repressing the masses denoted by Cc
m.
De￿nition 1 When the coloniser follows an "assimilation" strategy ("French"), the elite
is alienated from the masses and is therefore percieved by the latter as non-credible. Thus,
the coloniser incurs a cost of repression, Cc
m, associated with the fact that the masses are
not cooperating with the elites.
Thus, during colonial rule, the payo⁄for the coloniser is (Y ￿ X ￿ Cc
m) and the payo⁄
for the elite is X
Le
De￿nition 2 When the coloniser follows a "non-alienation" strategy ("British"), the
elite is more connected with the masses, and is therefore percieved by the latter as credible.
In this case, the size of the elite, Le0 is larger
￿
Le0 > Le￿
; and the cost of repression for
the coloniser is zero, for simplicity.
the traditional ties of the elite with the masses are maintained, implying that the elite is less likely to
face serious collective action problems.
24Similarly, this is a reasonable axiom in the sense that an assimilated elite is detached from the masses
and consequently, more likely to face serious collective action problems.
25Theoretically, this expected income is higher than the subsistence salary received by the masses
during colonisation.
26The ￿xed salary to the masses in this case is expected to be lower than the salary when the masses
are cooperating.
11Thus, during colonial rule, the payo⁄ for the coloniser is (Y ￿ X) and the payo⁄ for
the elite is X
Le0
Given this simple set up, the stage game can be summarised as follows:
￿ The society starts in colonisation
￿ The coloniser decides whether to continue with colonisation or leave the country
￿ Under colonisation, the elite decides whether to start a revolt while under decoloni-
sation, the elite decide whether to pay for the coloniser￿ s protection
￿ In both colonisation and decolonisation, the masses have to decide whether to co-
operate with the elite.
￿ Nature de￿nes the order of probabilities as follows: 0 < p00
w < pw < p0
w < 1, where
- p00
w is the probability of non-credible elites winning a war of independence
against colonisation,
- pw is the probability of non-credible elites winning a post-independence war
of rebellion engaged by the masses,
- p0
w is the probability of the "non-credible elite - coloniser" front winning a
post-independence war of rebellion engaged by the masses.
And p000
w is the probability of credible elites winning a war of independence
against colonisation. By de￿nition, 0 < p00
w < p000
w < 1.
To simplify the exposition, I assume that the decision of the masses to cooperate with
a credible elite (or not cooperate with a non-credible elite) is irreversible.
Given the set up of the game described above, I now divide the game into two de-
pending on the strategic choices of the masses. In the ￿rst subgame, I analyse the payo⁄s
when the masses are never cooperating with the elite during colonisation and decolonisa-
tion (that is, the case of assimilated or non-credible elite), while in the second subgame
I analyse the payo⁄s when the masses always cooperate with the elite (independent or
credible elite scenario). I then solve each subgame by backward induction.
12Figure 1: Game Tree of Assimilated or Non-Credible Elites
133.1 Subgame I - Colonisation and Decolonisation with Assimi-
lated or Non-Credible Elite
Refering to the game tree of assimilated elites illustrated in Figure 1 above, the coloniser
has the choice of continuing colonial rule (stay) or decolonising (leave). If the coloniser
chooses to stay and the elite cooperate with them, there is colonial rule with repression of
the masses as a result of the fact that the masses are not cooperating with the elite. The




If instead the coloniser stays and the elite refuses to cooperate with colonial rule,
a war of independence will ensue in which the coloniser attempts to depose, replace or




w is the probability of non-credible elites winning a war of independence against
the coloniser, and Cc
e is the cost to the coloniser of making war with the elites alone.




Le , where Ce
c is the cost that
assimilated elites incur for engaging the coloniser in a war of independence. Ce
c is de￿ned
for the range 0 < Ce
c < 1 because of the likelihood of extermination of rebellious elites.
Alternatively, if the coloniser chooses to leave and the elites ask for continued coopera-
tion thereafter, a stable autocracy is installed in the country. The pay-o⁄to the coloniser
in this case is p0
wQ￿Cc
m, where Cc
m is the costs that the coloniser incurs in maintaining sta-
bility in the country post independence.28 p0
w is the probability of the "non-credible elite
- coloniser" front successfully suppressing any post independence rebellion by the masses,
and Q is the cost to elites of maintaining the post independence imperial relationship




Finally, in the event that the coloniser leaves and the elite choose to go without the
coloniser￿ s protection, two outcomes are feasible depending on the character of the elite
(or its ability to e⁄ectively repress the masses). If the elite is able to e⁄ectively repress the
masses (probably because of its military capabilities), a stable autocracy will emerge in
the country. However, if the elite￿ s ability to repress the masses is questionable, a fragile
state will emerge post independence. The pay-o⁄s to the coloniser and non-credible elites
in this instance are 0 and
pw(Y ￿Ce
m)
Le respectively, where pw is the probability of non-
credible elites winning a post independence war of rebellion against the masses, and Ce
m is
27For simplicity, I assume that the elites always get a payo⁄ of zero for loosing either in the war of
independence against the coloniser or in a post independence war of rebellion engaged by the masses.
28I have assumed for simplicity, that the costs the coloniser incurs in maintaining stability in the
country is the same during colonisation and decolonisation.
14the cost that non-credible elites incur in waging war with the masses post independence.
3.1.1 Solution of the subgame
Since the strategy of the masses is never cooperate with the elites during colonisation and
decolonisation, the elite is faced with two choices - either cooperate or not cooperate with
the coloniser.
Cooperation is always a dominant strategy for non-credible elites if and only if the
latter￿ s payo⁄from cooperation during colonisation (and correspondingly, during decoloni-










w (Y ￿ Q)
Le >
pw (Y ￿ Ce
m)
Le (2)
Given the non-credible elite￿ s dominant strategy of cooperation, decolonisation is a





m > Y ￿ X ￿ C
c
m (3)








for which the payo⁄ from decolonising are higher than those from colonial rule.
Proof: Equation 1 above simply says that, non-credible elites will cooperate with colonial
rule as long as the per capita transfer that they recieve from the coloniser is greater than
their expected gains from not cooperating. Equation 2 implies that:
p
0
w (Y ￿ Q) > pw (Y ￿ C
e


























w ; 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1:
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Equation 4 above suggests that there exists an upper bound of Q, that is, (Q < Ce
m)
when ￿ = 0, or when p0
w = pw for which decolonisation is rational for the coloniser.






Hence, equation 5 suggests that there exists a lower bound of Q, equal to Y ￿X
p0
w , for
which the coloniser is willing to decolonise.
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Equation 6 above de￿nes the feasible range of Q, for which decolonisation occurs. In
other words, equation 6 de￿nes the range of feasible gains which the coloniser is willing
to accept in exchange for its protection of the power of the post independence governing
elites from subversion by the masses.
3.1.2 Intuition and Implications of the Results
Given the elite￿ s dominant strategy of always cooperating with the coloniser, the main
factors that determine the switch from colonisation to neo-colonialism are namely, the
output from the colony (Y ), the amount of transfers made by the coloniser to the elite (X),
and the probability of the "non-credible elites - coloniser" alliance successfully suppressing
future subversion by the masses (p0
w), as demonstrated in equation 5 above.
The above named parameters are largely at the appreciation of the coloniser, suggest-
ing that the initiative to decolonise in this case primarily originates from the coloniser.
Consequently, this analysis ￿ts well with the Eurocentric explanation of decolonisation,
which claims that the colonisers left mainly because the utility from being a coloniser was
declining.
Accordingly, this scenario best depicts the French decolonisation process in sub-Saharan
Africa where France is known to have suddenly and unilaterally transformed all of its 16
former colonies29 into independent republics in the same year (1960).30
29Except for Guinea that had earlier bolted out of the French Community.
30See for instance, Birmingham (1995:26) where the author argues that French colonialism had given
way to neo-colonialism as the ties between France and the new republics is no longer constitutional but
cultural and commercial.
16Figure 2: Game Tree of Independent or Credible Elites
173.2 Subgame II - Colonisation and Decolonisation with Inde-
pendent or Credible Elite
Refering to the game tree of independent elites illustrated in Figure 2 above, the coloniser
has the choice of either staying or leaving. If he stays and the elite cooperate with him,
there is colonial rule without repression of the masses. Accordingly, the payo⁄s to the
coloniser and credible elites are respectively, Y ￿ X and X
Le0.
If instead the coloniser stays and the elite refuse to cooperate with colonial rule, a
war of independence will ensue in which the coloniser attempts to depose, replace or even




em is the cost the coloniser incurs in waging war against a joint elite-mass nationalist
front and p000
w is the probability of credible elites winning a war of independence against the






Le0 , where A > 0,
is an indirect cost that credible elites incur in rebellion against the coloniser (speci￿cally,
it is a ￿xed transfer that they pay in order to purchase the cooperation of the masses)
and Ce0
c is the cost that credible elites incur directly for ￿ghting against the coloniser.
Alternatively, if the coloniser chooses to leave and the elites ask for continued coop-
eration thereafter, the outcome of this scenario might be peace cautioned by external
protection from the coloniser and the pay-o⁄s are Q, and
Y ￿Q￿A
Le0 to the coloniser and
credible elites respectively.32 Q is as de￿ned in the preceding scenario of non-credible
elites.
Finally, in the event that the coloniser leaves and the elite choose to go without
the coloniser￿ s protection, this might result in "complete" independence, although the
cooperation ties existing between the elites and masses might not necessarily be sustained
afterwards.33 The resulting pay-o⁄s are thus 0 and Y ￿A
Le0 for the coloniser and credible
elites respectively, where A in this case, is the amount of transfers needed by the elites to
purchase peace with the masses after the coloniser departs.
31Note that as before, I assume for simplicity that the payo⁄ to the elites for loosing the war of
independence is always zero.
32Following the initial premise that the masses always cooperate with independent elites, an implicit
assumption has been made that A, the cost to independent elites of purchasing the cooperation of the
masses, is the same during colonisation and decolonisation.
33It is worth mentioning that a new form of strategic bargaining for the control of resources might
likely arise between the elites and the masses post independence which might probably jeopardize the
"entente" between the two groups. Fedderke & Kularatne (2008) have a nice exposition of this scenario.
183.2.1 Solution of the subgame
Since the strategy of the masses is always cooperation with the elites during colonisation
and decolonisation, the elite is faced with two choices - either cooperate or not cooperate
with the coloniser.
Non-cooperation is always a dominant strategy for credible elites if and only if the
latter￿ s payo⁄from non-cooperation during colonisation (and correspondingly, during de-

































Y ￿ Q ￿ A
Le (9)
Observe also that as long as Q > 0, equation 9 is always true.
Given the credible elite￿ s dominant strategy of non-cooperation, decolonisation is a
dominant strategy for the coloniser if and only if:





Proposition 2: As the probability of elite nationalist movements winning a war of
independence against the coloniser approaches unity, the coloniser is better-o⁄quiting the












w ) for which the coloniser is better-o⁄ decolonising.
Proof: Equation 8 above de￿nes the minimum bound of output produced in the colony,
Y , which guarantees elites non-cooperation with colonial rule. It suggests that as long
as the output produced in the colony is at least greater than the combined costs to the
credible elites of, buying the support of the masses in rebellion against the coloniser (A)
and making war with the coloniser (Ce
c), the elites will always rebel against colonisation.
On condition that Cc
em > 0, equation 10 implies that as the probability of success of
elite-led war of independence against the coloniser rises, (i.e. p000
w ￿! 1;), the coloniser is
better o⁄leaving. Equation 10 also suggests that decolonisation might become a rational
19option for the coloniser when nationalism is strong, that is, as Cc
em ￿! 1.
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Equation 12 above de￿nes the range of feasible values of output produced in the colony,
Y , for which it is no longer expedient for the coloniser to stay.
3.2.2 Intuition and Implications of the Results
The solution of the preceding subgame suggests that, when the elites are credible, they
will always ￿nd it optimal to rebel against the coloniser as long as the output produced
in the colony is at least greater than (A + Ce0
c ).
The results above suggest that the coloniser might attempt to resist the rebellion of
the elites, as long as the coloniser￿ s cost of engaging in a war of independence, Cc
em, is
less than a fraction (1 ￿ p000
w) of total output, Y . However, as Cc
em rises inde￿nitely, or
as the probability of nationalist elites winning a war of independence approaches unity
(p000
w ￿! 1), there is no other option left for the coloniser but to switch from ￿ghting a
war of independence to granting full independence. Equation 12 above de￿nes the range
of feasible values of total output produced in the colony that guarantees the switch from
colonisation to independence.
The way that these results should be understood is that, in contrast with the preceding
case of assimilated elites, human capital transfers from the coloniser to the elites in this
case serve also in resolving elites￿collective action problems which potentially raises both
Cc
em and p000
w, until it is no longer feasible for the colonisers to stay. This scenario therefore
upholds the Afrocentric explanation of decolonisation.
Typical examples of decolonisation processes depicted by this scenario are the British
decolonisations in most of sub-Saharan Africa, where Britain characteristically engaged
in wars of independence with nationalist movements before ￿nally conceding to indepen-
dence.34 It is perhaps worth recalling that independence in many former British colonies
34The characteristic pattern of transfer of power by Britain in sub-Saharan Africa consisted ￿rst in
procrastination, followed by a phase of violence begets violence, then ￿nally conceding to complete inde-
20in Africa was generally followed by political instability as a result of the emergence of a
new strategic bargaining between the elites and the masses.
Other examples include the decolonisation of the Lusophone states of Guinea-Bissua,
Angola and Mozambique where nationalist organisations engaged in protracted guerrilla
warfare with Portugal before the latter ￿nally conceded to independence. Furthermore,
independence in the Lusophone African countries generally resulted in fragile states as
prolonged post-colonial wars ensued between rival nationalist factions seeking to control
economic resources.
3.3 Variants of Subgame I - Colonisation & Decolonisation with
Assimilated Elite
Continuing to refer to Figure 1 above, I now discuss scenarios whereby cooperation with
the coloniser is no longer a dominant strategy of non-credible elites. I distinguish three
cases namely, where assimilated elites cooperate with the coloniser during colonial rule
but refuse cooperation after independence, where assimilated elites always refuse coop-
eration with the coloniser both during colonial rule and after independence, and where
assimilated elites do not cooperate with the coloniser during colonial rule but cooperate
after independence.
3.3.1 1st Variant: Assimilated elites cooperate with the coloniser during colo-
nial rule but refuse cooperation after independence. The independence
outcome is either a stable autocracy or a fragile state depending on the
character of the elites.
From Figure 1 above, cooperation with the coloniser during colonial rule is a dominant
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On the other hand, non-cooperation with the coloniser post independence is a domi-
nant strategy for assimilated elites if and only if:















Given the above choices of the elites, the coloniser￿ s dominant strategy is to decolonise
if and only if:
0 > Y ￿ X ￿ C
c
m =) (X + C
c
m) > Y (14)
Equation 13 above suggests that assimilated elites dominant strategy of non-cooperation
with the coloniser post independence is largely dependent on the elites ability to e⁄ec-
tively repress the masses. As long as the elites cost of repressing the masses, Ce
m, is less
than what is needed to purchase the coloniser￿ s protection, Q, the elite always refuses
cooperation with the coloniser post independence.
Equation 14 suggests that whenever the costs of colonial rule is greater than the
coloniser￿ s derived utility from empire, it makes sense to decolonise.
The combined interpretation of equations 13 and 14 above suggests that the pattern of
decolonisation whereby elites cooperate with the coloniser during colonisation but refuse
cooperation after independence is feasible under two simultaneous conditions namely,
1 - whenever the colony is no longer pro￿table to the coloniser
2 - and as long as the elites are capable of e⁄ectively suppressing any post independence
subversion by the masses.
This could be the case that the elites form part of the military. This scenario uni￿es
both the Eurocentric and Afrocentric explanations of decolonisation because the utility
derived from empires as well as the character of the elite (or speci￿cally, its ability to
repress the masses) both matter in the decision to decolonise.
3.3.2 2nd Variant: Assimilated elites always refuse cooperation with the
coloniser both during colonial rule and after independence. The inde-
pendence outcome could either be a stable autocracy or a fragile state
depending on the character of the elite.
Refering to Figure 1 above, non-cooperation with the coloniser during colonisation is a
dominant strategy for assimilated elites if and only if:
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On the other hand, non-cooperation with the coloniser post independence is a domi-
nant strategy for assimilated elites if and only if:








m < (1 ￿ ￿)Q + ￿Y (16)
where ￿ is as previously de￿ned.
Given the above choices of the elites, the coloniser￿ s dominant strategy is to decolonise
if and only if:












Equation 17 above suggests that the coloniser will leave whenever the probability of







. Notice also that as the
coloniser￿ s cost of ￿ghting the war of independence with the elites, Cc
e, rises inde￿nitely,
it is much preferable for the coloniser to leave.
The combined interpretation of equations 15, 16 and 17 above suggests that the pattern
of decolonisation whereby assimilated elites never cooperate with the coloniser during
colonisation and after independence is feasible under two simultaneous conditions namely,
1 - whenever the elites￿probability of winning the war of independence against the
coloniser, p00










2 - and as long as the elites are capable of e⁄ectively suppressing any post independence
subversion by the masses.
The above conditions could either be the result of some personal revolutionary char-
acteristic of the nationalist elites, or its appartenance to the military. This is a variant of
the Afrocentric explanation of decolonisation because the character of the elite (or specif-
ically, its ability to threaten the colonial system and repress the masses at the same time)
does matter in the decision to decolonise.
An example of decolonisation that might represent this scenario is the British dis-
23engagement of Uganda where independence was achieved not so much because of the
strength of nationalist movements, but precisely because of the personal charisma of mil-
itary leaders such as Milton Obote and Idi Amin Dada.35
3.3.3 3rd Variant:Assimilated elites do not cooperate with the coloniser dur-
ing colonial rule but cooperate after independence. The independence
outcome is a stable autocracy.
Refering to Figure 1 above, non-cooperation with the coloniser during colonisation is a
dominant strategy for assimilated elites if and only if:
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On the other hand, cooperation with the coloniser post independence is a dominant
strategy for assimilated elites if and only if:
Q < (1 ￿ ￿)C
e
m + ￿Y (18)
where ￿ is as de￿ned before. When ￿ = 0, Q has an upper bound de￿ned by Ce
m.
Given the above choices of the elites, the coloniser￿ s dominant strategy is to decolonise


























Equation 19 above suggests a minimum bound of Q, for which decolonisation followed
by the cooperation of assimilated elites occurs.
The combined interpretation of equations 18 and 19 above, suggests that the pattern
of decolonisation whereby elites obtain independence through con￿ ict with the coloniser
yet cooperate with the latter post independence, is feasible under the following conditions
namely:
1 - the elite￿ s cost of repressing the masses (post independence) is at least greater than
35See Thorn (2000:54) for this evidence. Another example of decolonisation that depended much on
the personal character of the elite could be the Belgians and General Mobutu of the Congo, although the
post-colonial imperial relationships that Mobutu maintained do not clearly ￿t in this scenario.
24its cost of purchasing the coloniser￿ s protection against the masses.
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This scenario upholds both the Eurocentric and Afrocentric explanations of decoloni-
sation. This is because the character of the elite and the expectations of the coloniser
both matter in the decision to decolonise. An example of a decolonisation process that
followed this route could be the French decolonisation of Algeria where the emerging
nationalist leader, Ben Bella, was compelled to accept proposals of limited continuity
of French imperialism after having fought one of the longest wars of decolonisation in
Africa.36 Ofcourse, Ben Bella was quickly overthrown three years later and an authori-
tarian rule under BoumØdienne was established in the country for almost a quarter of a
century.
3.4 Variants of Subgame II - Colonisation & Decolonisation with
Independent Elite
Refering to Figure 2 above, I now discuss the unique scenario whereby non-cooperation
with the coloniser is no longer a dominant strategy of independent elites.
3.4.1 Unique Variant: Independent elites cooperate with the coloniser during
colonial rule but refuse cooperation after independence. The indepen-
dence outcome could be a stable monarchy.
Cooperation with the coloniser during colonisation is a dominant strategy for independent
elites if and only if:
X > p
000
w (Y ￿ A ￿ C
e0
c ) (20)
On the other hand, as previously observed, non-cooperation with the coloniser is
always a dominant strategy for independent elites post independence.
36The Evian agreement of March 1962 between the French colonial authorities and leaders of the
Algerian Liberation Front (FLN) provided for (1) a transitory period of three years for French settlers to
decide whether they wanted to remain French citizens or become Algerian citizens (2) French companies
to maintain their leasing rights to develop oil ￿elds (3) and France was allowed to maintain the important
naval base at Mers-el-Kebir for a minimum of ￿fteen years (although she withdrew as early as 1968),
Thorn (2000:84).
25Given the above choices of the elites, the coloniser￿ s dominant strategy is to decolonise
if and only if:
0 > Y ￿ X (21)
As observed from equation 21 above, the decolonisation decision is largely the initiative
of the coloniser, and is precisely because colonial rule has become unpro￿table. This
scenario is a classic representation of the Eurocentric perspective of decolonisation and
the transfer of power is expected to occur in an amicable atmosphere.
However, in this scenario, the post-colonial elite changes its attitude towards the
coloniser and becomes radical or uncompromising once independence is acquired. An
example of decolonisation that depicts this scenario could be the British disengagament
in Egypt whereby imperial relationship with the nationalist elites changed dramatically
for the worse after independence.37 Harold Macmillan, British Prime Minister of the
early 1960s, is quoted to have regretted the change in attitude of Nasser, the post-colonial
Egyptian leader whom Britian had trusted, as he lamented:
"the collapse of the agreeable, educated, Liberal, North Oxford society to whom
we have transferred power"38
4 The Model and Empirical Observations
The results of the model predict four important di⁄erences between the French and British
models of colonisation and decolonisation in West Africa:
1 - French colonisation was generally more repressive than British colonisation. On the
other hand, French decolonisation was smooth and peaceful while British decolonisation
was often protracted and violent. Also, the pace of transition to independence in French
West Africa was generally faster than that in British West Africa.
2 - Former French West African colonies are generally more stable politically than
their British counterparts after independence.
3 - During colonisation, francophone West African elites were more professionally
inclined to government occupations than their Anglophone counterparts.
37Colonel Nasser, shortly after independence in July 1956, nationalised the Suez Canal, which was vital
to Britain￿ s trade and oil supplies.
38Quoted in Thorn (2000:48).
264 - Francophone West African elites were more disconnected from their countrymen
than their Anglophone counterparts.
A close look at the historical data presented in Figure 3 below seems to con￿rm these
theoretical predictions.




















Burkina Faso 1960 13 39 362 Gambia 1965 3 11 0
Benin 1960 15 45 9.39 0 Ghana 1957 22 54 0.03 38.2 21
Central A. Rep 1960 10 32 102.9 1 Nigeria 1960 12 40 30.6 15
Chad 1960 5 13 9.6 1 Sierra Leone 1961 16 48 14.9 3
Congo Rep 1960 10 26 9
Gabon 1960 4 6 0
Guinea 1958 12 22 131.6 0
Ivory Coast 1960 6 14 0.07 14.5 1
Mali 1960 7 15 348.2 9
Mauritania 1960 10 24 705.1 7
Niger 1960 6 22 47.4 1
Senegal 1960 1 3 39.8 1
Togo 1960 11 31 10
Average 1959.8 8.5 22.5 177.1 3.3 Average 1960.7 13.2 38.2 27.9 9.7
a: Coups include the number of plots, failed and successful coups from 1956 to 2001, McGowan (2003).
b: Total Military Intervention Score (TMIS) captures trends in coup behaviour during 1956-2001, McGowan (2003).
c: Average number of prisoners of criminal offences in 1936 as a percentage of country's population. Source: Asiwaju (2000:53) for Ivorian figures, Kay & Stephen (1972) for Ghanaian figures.
d: Income distance at independence, calculated by taking the ratio of income of top 10% and bottom 10% of population, figures available rom World Income Inequality datasets
e: Number of cases of repression recorded between 1950 and year of independence, obtained from Alesina et al (1992) datasets
French West African States British West African States
For instance, columns 2 and 9 of Figure 3 suggests that independence was achieved
on average much faster in French West Africa than in British West Africa. Furthermore,
columns 3, 4, 10 and 11 con￿rm that post independence French West African states
witnessed less coup d￿ Øtats and less military interventions, thus were generally more stable
than their British counterparts. Also, prior to independence, British West African states
witnessed more acts of repression than their French counterparts as columns 7 and 14
suggest.
Columns 5 and 12 gives us the per capita number of prisoners of criminal o⁄ences
in 1936 (far in the period of colonial rule) for Ivory Coast and Ghana respectively.39 In
addition to this evidence, several historical sources also con￿rm that French colonial rule
39For the years 1933, 1934 and 1935, the per capita number of prisoners in Ivory Coast was 0.05, 0.05
and 0.07, respectively, while in Ghana it was 0.03 throughout those years, Asiwaju (2000) and Kay &
Stephen (1972).
27was not only highly repressive but also heavy in terms of the ￿scal burden.40 For instance,
Crowder (1968:185), cites the "code d￿ indigØnat" as clear evidence of the repressiveness of
French colonial rule. The code, which applied to the African masses only and in existence
from the early 20th century, envisaged about ￿fty punishable o⁄ences.
Besides these o⁄ences, under the code, each adult African was liable to an annual tax
in labour equivalent to 12 days labour, redeemable at 1-3 Franc CFA a day. Due to the
repressiveness of French colonial rule, Asiwaju (2000) contends that, there were massive
exodus of peoples from Ivory Coast and the neighbouring French colonies into Ghana
during the 1930s.
Finally, columns 6 and 13 suggests that the income distance between the elites and
the masses were furthest in former French colonies in comparison with former British
colonies, which lends some credence to the basic assumption of the model that Francoph-
one West African elites were more disconnected from the masses than their Anglophone
counterparts.
Table 1 below provides evidence in support of the fact that francophone West African
elites were more professionally inclined to government occupations during the period be-
tween 1947-1952. The ￿gures show that averagely about three-quarters of francophone
West African leaders represented in the territorial legislative assembly were colonial gov-
ernment employees.41 In other words, these elites largely depended for their livelihood
on colonial government employment or patronage. In the former British colony of the
Gold Coast in contrast, an investigation into the background of 32 active members of the
pioneer nationalist movement, the National Congress of British West Africa (NCBWA)
Gold Coast branch in the 1920s, reveals that about 90% of them were employed in the
liberal professions, Gi⁄ord & Louis (1971).
5 Conclusion
The ￿rst endeavour of this study has been to highlight the di⁄erences in British and French
colonial education practices. I then used these distinguishing features in outlining a simple
model which throws light into why the approaches to, and outcomes of decolonisation in
40Crowder (1968:186) contends that the idea which seemed best to the French colonial system for
achieving the employment of native labour, was to impose relatively high taxes on blacks, and in default
of payment they would incur a sentence of forced labour.
41The French sociologist, George Balandier, has coined the term "administrative bourgeoisies" to de-
scribe Francophone African elites.
28Table 1: Professional Background of Francophone West African Leaders during 1947-1952.
Source: Morgenthau (1964)




% in Liberal Pro-
fessions
Ivory Coast 27 78 15
Mali 28 86 15
Upper Volta 40 87 2
Niger 20 90 -
Senegal 50 42 18
Guinea 16 75 25
these two empires have di⁄ered signi￿cantly the one from the other. Using game theoretic
analysis, the study argues that the pattern of decolonisation was a function of the nature of
human capital transfers from the colonisers to the indigenous elites of the former colonies,
and this shaped the strategic relationship between these two groups.
Where the colonial education ideology emphasized the notion of "assimilation", the
system generally tended to produce elites that depended highly on the coloniser for their
livelihood, hence necessitating a continuation of the imperial relationship even after in-
dependence was obtained. On the contrary, where the ideology emphasized the strength-
ening of the "solid elements" of the countryside, the system tended to produce a bunch
of elites that were quite independent of the coloniser and consequently had little to loose
from a disruption of the imperial relationship at independence.
The model raises several predictions based on a single assumption on the nature of the
indigenous elite. Speci￿cally, the results of the model shed light into why the French de-
colonisation process in West Africa was generally smooth and transited from colonialism
to neo-colonialism whereas British decolonisations in West Africa were generally antago-
nistic, often culminating in complete independence from England. The model also throws
light into the di⁄erent paths of decolonisation on the African continent. The contribution
of the study has been in providing a framework for understanding the di⁄erent paths
of decolonisation in Africa in general, but more speci￿cally in the British and French
West African empires, an approach which uni￿es both the Eurocentric and Afrocentric
perspectives.
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